The merger between Vodfone and Mannesmann

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The instance on amalgamation between two viing firms- British telecommunication house, Vodafone Airtouch and German cellular supplier, Mannesmann AG- shall be my high spot of this study. In short, this instance illustrates a hostile coup d’etat by Vodafone. Vodafone initiates the amalgamation as it sees it as an chance for the house to spread out in a quickly altering communications engineering environment in Europe at that point in clip. Initially, Mannesmann rejected the proposal. However, in a turn of event, it was finally left without a pick but to amalgamation with Vodafone. Third parties were enraged as they view this move as anticompetitive. They argued that the meeting entity would derive dominant market power, rise barriers to entry and harvest economic systems to scale which they could merely woolgather of. The instance was brought Forth to the European Commission which merely allow for the amalgamation to win after Mannesmann de-merge with Orange and besides after Vodafone ensured that it will enable 3rd party non-discriminatory entree to the merged entity ‘s incorporate web so as to supply advanced nomadic services to their several clients. The Commission viewed these projects as sufficient to take the competition concerns linked to the inability of 3rd parties to supply competitory seamless pan-European Mobile services.

In this study, I ‘ll analyse the economic benefits, how amalgamation impacts upon consumers and/or manufacturers benefit, every bit good as, the entire public assistance. I ‘ll besides touch on how amalgamation has the possible to cut down competition and eventually, the logical thinking of the competition authorization ‘s determination that leads to the success of the amalgamation.


The amalgamation between Vodafone is Mannesmann is considered to be a horizontal 1 since both companies operates within telecommunication industry. The amalgamation of the two entities reduces the figure of viing houses by one and at the same clip, increases the industrial concentration. In theory, a decrease in figure of houses viing reduces supply whilst increasing monetary values of the good which is deemed to be harmful to consumers. The construct of improving/diminishing consumer excess is further discussed later in the study.

It is non ever true that fewer houses and higher monetary values needfully translate into higher net incomes for the meeting houses. For case, profitableness of each house is A? in a four-firm industry. So, net incomes of two single houses merely add up to A? . Now, three houses remain after the amalgamation of two. We observe a diminution in profitableness from A? to 1/3 for the incorporate houses. And although higher industrial concentration improves gross revenues, this addition in gross revenues is non plenty to countervail the rise in monetary values charged. Profitability still declines doing the meeting houses worse off. Therefore, bear downing at monetary value peers to fringy cost provides no inducement to unify unless all houses in the industry merge to organize a monopoly.

Having mentioned the above, amalgamation does n’t merely take topographic point merely when all houses merge. In world, instances such as Vodafone/Mannesmann showed that amalgamations can take to be decrease. The efficiency that arises could be strong plenty to drive this amalgamation. Firms will desire to bring forth at the minimal point of the AC curve where they ‘ll be bring forthing expeditiously. They avoid duplicate of fixed costs when they consolidate direction and non using two people to execute an indistinguishable undertaking. By making so, the houses are able to take down their cost of labor. In add-on, both houses are merely needed to pay a fixed cost such as land and operating installations, merely one time after the amalgamation. Efficaciously, a cost economy of the fixed cost will increase net incomes, supplying an inducement to unify particularly when they increase their monetary values. Hence, the houses may make away with excess labor, assets and installations.

As we know, a amalgamation would take to a rise in monetary value as lesser houses are left viing in the industry. Firms are better off with a higher monetary value imposed on consumers and when they gain from higher manufacturer excess. The opposite applies for consumers who are worse off when monetary values increase. When the addition in manufacturer excess outweighs the lessening in consumer excess, entire public assistance is said to hold addition.

However, when the amalgamation reduces fringy cost for Vodafone and Mannesmann, the incorporate houses may go through on such lower cost to their consumers in the signifier of lower monetary values. Lower monetary values are by and large good to consumers. As consumer excess rise, there will be a subsequent addition in entire public assistance.

Furthermore, there might once more be cost efficiencies which explain why incorporate houses can incur a lower marginal cost than the two pre-merger houses. Synergies can be easy exploited between the meeting houses. Each house knows what the other house is capable of making and therefore, they merely produce goods and services that give them the competitory advantage. Overall, a autumn in fringy cost would intend cost salvaging that facilitates profitableness. This profitableness, in bend, promotes amalgamation.

Monetary value, P


P1 = C1

C2 Demand, D

0 Q2 Q1 Quantity, Q

Figure 1: Diagram exemplifying public assistance effects of a cost reduction amalgamation ( Adapted from talk slides )

From Figure 1, there is no manufacturer excess when monetary value peers to be ( P1 = C1 ) . Firms are merely gaining net incomes while bring forthing at Q1. At this phase, consumer excess resides in the country under the demand curve and above the C1 horizontal cost curve. After the amalgamation between Vodafone and Mannesmann, lesser houses are left viing and hence, monetary value additions from P1 to P2. Consumers are bit by bit worse off with the rise in monetary value. Now, their excess is reduced to the country under the demand curve and above P2. The country enclosed within P2, P1 and Q2 is the excess that is transferred from consumer to manufacturer. On the other manus, the triangular countries under the demand curve, but bounded within Q1, Q2 and P1 signifies the deadweight loss. This deadweight loss refers to the excess that is no longer gained by consumers and manufacturers.

Concurrently, there could be synergisms between the meeting houses that enable cost economy. This cost efficiency lowers cost from C1 to C2. Firms are better away. As shown in Figure 1, the country enclosed within P2, C2 and Q2 represents entire manufacturer excess after the amalgamation. The country within C1, C2 and Q2 is the excess gained by manufacturers from synergism that render better chances to turn borders.

Looking at the above, we see that it is good for houses to unify as they incur manufacturer excess. Entire excess improves as a consequence of a rise in manufacturer excess.

Traveling on, we shall see competition with respects to the amalgamation between Vodafone and Mannesmann. Assuming that there ‘s no cost economy, a rise in monetary value due to amalgamation will finally gnaw consumer excess well, to a point where losingss to consumer outweigh additions to manufacturers. From the manufacturer ‘s point of position, this may supply an inducement for them to seek alibis to unify. They may distort information to convert competition governments to O.K. amalgamation.

Taking the impact of amalgamation into history, competition governments have to critically make up one’s mind on whether to O.K. a amalgamation particularly those which involve big houses like Vodafone and Mannesmann. Such determination procedure will necessitate them to acquire clasp of accurate information which is non ever easy to obtain.

One chief concerned of competition governments is the size of the incorporate house. Markets dominated by big houses tend to farther inflate monetary values and force down consumer ‘s public assistance. With mention to the instance at manus, competition governments were ab initio loath to allow amalgamation to both houses. They were concerned that amalgamation between the two big houses will turn out black as they are already bring forthing beyond Q* due to their sheer size. Approving their amalgamation would merely intend that these houses operate beyond the MES. Firms that merge at this phase face diseconomies of graduated table when cost is driven up as they continue to increase end product along the AC curve.

Cost, C Average Cost, AC


0 Q* Quantity, Q

Figure 2: Diagram exemplifying Minimum Efficient Scale ( MES ) on the AC curve.

Rival houses strongly disapprove Vodafone ‘s proposal to unify with Mannesmann as they view the move as being anti-competitive. They argued that the merged entity will be able to supply sole services on a seamless footing because the merged entity has the integrated web that such services require. In the proposal, nevertheless, Vodafone claimed that if an interrelated web did develop it would non give rise to competition concerns, both because there will be scope for such webs to develop, and because there will be other paths for operators to guarantee just competition within the telecommunication industry. In any event, Vodafone considers that other operators will be in a place to supply “ seamless ” services on the same range in the close hereafter.


The Commission ‘s probe has shown that with the complexnesss involved in holding on the alteration on the bing web constellation, centralised direction solutions and cost and net income allotment will do it extremely hard for 3rd parties to retroflex. In add-on to the uncertainness as to the reproduction of the merged entity ‘s web by agencies of the right combination of amalgamations, this procedure would be highly dearly-won, clip consuming and fraught with regulative holds given the demand for regulative blessing. This is supported by the important figure of failures over the past old ages in edifice similar solutions in related markets within the model of joint ventures or strategic confederations.

The merged entity would be the lone Mobile operator able to capture future growing through new clients who would be attracted by the seamless services offered by Vodafone/Mannesmann on its ain web. Rival houses which could non offer a comparable service to pull adequate market portions will happen themselves losing out in the competition. Furthermore, given their inability to retroflex the new entity ‘s web, rivals will hold, at best, i.e. if they are allowed entree to Vodafone ‘s web at all, important costs and performance/quality disadvantages given its dependence on Vodafone/Mannesmann. The incorporate entity ‘s power to decline 3rd parties ‘ entree to the its web or to let entree on footings and conditions entrench the incorporate entity into a dominant place and diminishes 3rd party offerings.

What ‘s more, clients would by and large prefer Vodafone/Mannesmann to other nomadic operators given its matchless possibility to supply advanced seamless services across Europe. This reinforces the incorporate entity ‘s place in the industry as a dominant participant.

And through its matchless big client base and place, Vodafone/Mannesmann will be in a alone bargaining power against French telephone makers to negociate design functionalities unavailable to viing operators. Custom-making French telephones make it more hard for wanderers from viing nomadic operators to take advantage of the advanced pan-European services available over Vodafone ‘s web. Again, rivals lose out if the amalgamation were to be approved.

Upon probe the Authorities revealed that the merged entity would confront stiff competition from other operators and will non bask a dominant buying power in the long tally. They agreed that the merged entity will be a strong purchaser in the market for nomadic French telephones and web equipment, but at that place remain many other comparable officeholders viing in the market. So, the merged entity would non accomplish the necessary purchasing power to go dominant on the market.

In the visible radiation of the above the governments concluded, “ aˆ¦ the notified dealing does non take to the creative activity or strengthening of a dominant place in the planetary markets for nomadic French telephone and nomadic web equipment as a consequence of which effectual competition would be important impeded in those markets. ” Meaning to state, the governments do non see the amalgamation as a important menace since it ‘s powers would hold been neutralized by other relevant rivals within the industry.

Further safeguards were taken in guaranting just competition within the industry as seen in the demerger of Orange with Mannesmann. This move aims at thining the powers of Vodafone and Mannesmann after the blessing of their amalgamation. It is a well-received determination as it removes the competitory convergences in the United Kingdom and Belgian markets of telecommunication services.

Besides Vodafone has, on its ain history, pledged to enable 3rd party non-discriminatory entree to the amalgamation entity ‘s incorporate web that includes projects which cover sole roaming understandings, 3rd parties ‘ entree to rolling agreements, 3rd parties ‘ entree to sweeping agreements, criterions and SIM-cards and a set of implementing steps aimed at guaranting their effectivity. On top of that, it has proposed to put up a fast path difference declaration process in order to work out dissensions in the mentioned facets and besides to cut down its anticompetitive stance. The projects every bit good as demerger is thought to be justifiable since it eliminates the competition concerns linked to the inability of 3rd parties to supply similar competitory seamless pan-European Mobile services.


In decision, Vodafone ‘s proposal to unify with Mannesmann is seen as an anticompetitive menace to other telecommunication service supplier. Rival houses were concerned that the amalgamation would confer significant market power to the merged entity. Therefore, they were strongly against the amalgamation proposal. However, after much consideration by the competition governments, they concluded that the amalgamation would non bring down much menace due to the presence of a figure of strong, big and powerful purchasers in the market which prevent Vodafone/Mannesmann from accomplishing dominant place on the proviso of the related services. Furthermore, the demerger of Orange with Mannesmann will gnaw market power of the merged entity. Furthermore, Vodafone submit projects that allow 3rd parties entree to its webs. Following the execution of these projects, 3rd parties will be in a place to offer viing advanced pan-European Mobile services which besides prevent the outgrowth of a dominant place on the proviso of these services. The possibility to offer similar services in competition with Vodafone will, in bend, besides develop inducements for 3rd parties to develop viing webs. Therefore, the governments approved of the amalgamation between Vodafone and Mannesmann.

To some extent, I disagree that the amalgamation should be approved. The governments ‘ statement that the presence of comparable officeholders will be sufficient in cut downing market power of the merged entity comes across as weak to me. Merely few of such officeholders operate within the telecommunication industry. Therefore, it ‘s influence on the merged entity ‘s market power is about negligible. Vodafone/Mannesmann could still run like a monopoly by puting high monetary values and cut downing end product while raising barrier to entry to discourage competition. Consumer public assistance would be greatly harmed as a consequence of the amalgamation.

On the other manus, I support the amalgamation as it encourages inventions. In today ‘s competitory society, merely the strongest emerge as title-holders. Therefore, rival houses may put in Research and Development ( R & A ; D ) in making an advanced communicative engineering or web system that gives it a competitory border over Vodafone/Mannesmann bing resources. This encourages a advanced competitory that benefits society as a whole. Manufacturers gain as it may develop thoughts to increase efficiency while consumers may derive from possibly cheaper pricing that is passed on to them from lower production cost incurred by manufacturers.


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Kendall ( 2010 ) , Markets, Competition and Regulation Lecture Notes Session 8: Amalgamations ; and Session 9: Competition Policy

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United Kingdom Competition Commission, hypertext transfer protocol: // # full, accessed on 15 November 2010

Europa Press Release Rapid “ Commission clears amalgamation between Vodafone Airtouch and Mannesmann AG with conditions ” , hypertext transfer protocol: // reference=IP/00/373

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